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I. INTRODUCTION
Decisions by management to selectively discipline union officials
who violate the no-strike provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment have met with varying degrees of acceptance by arbitrators, the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"), and the
courts. The extent to which the various forums have accepted selec-
tive disciplining reflects the different function that each forum serves
in federal labor law and the collective bargaining system. In turn, the
function each forum serves defines to some extent the values that the
different decisionmakers bring to the determination of the selective
discipline issue. As the doctrinal focus of the Board and the courts
has evolved, the role played by arbitrators in private dispute resolu-
tion has experienced a corresponding change. Two factors in particu-
lar have affected the arbitrator's role in deciding the selective
discipline issue. The first is the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB I which established the legal
standard for a contractual waiver of a union leader's statutory right to
be free from selective sanctions.2 The second is the Board's adoption
1. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
2. Id. at 707-10.
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of a more expansive deferral policy. 3 Both the waiver standard and
the Board's deferral policy have expanded the scope of arbitral adjudi-
cation, increasing the possibility that public statutory issues will be
decided in the context of a private dispute resolution process. The
way in which the arbitral values that traditionally have informed pri-
vate dispute resolution affect and are affected by external public law
will be the focus of this Comment.
Metropolitan Edison resolved the legality of disparate sanctioning
of union officials. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, in'the
absence of an explicit contractual provision imposing a higher duty
upon union officials to prevent work stoppages, imposing more severe
sanctions on union representatives than on other employees for partic-
ipating in an unlawful work stoppage violates Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") 4 by unfairly dis-
criminating against an employee because of his union membership.5
In so holding, the Court made the resolution of an unfair labor prac-
tice charge of discriminatory treatment synonymous with the determi-
nation of whether the statutory right of union leaders to be free from
selective discipline had been waived through collective bargaining.
The Court required any waiver of this right to be "clear and unmis-
takable";6 however, in determining whether this standard had been
met, the Court would permit the Board to consider the "circum-
3. "Deferral" occurs when the Board refrains from adjudicating the merits of a claim
because an arbitrator has already decided the case or could do so under the collective
bargaining agreement. For a discussion of the Board's current deferral policy, see infra notes
9-13 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Distinguishing Arbitration and Private
Settlement in NLRB Deferral Policy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341 (1989).
4. The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) makes it "an unfair labor practice for
an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, tit. II, § 202(3), 61 Stat. 136,
153 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The LMRA served to
amend the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (NLRA). Subsections 8(a)(l) and
8(a)(3) of the NLRA provide:
a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7] of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
5. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 702-05, 708 (1983).
6. Id. at 708.
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stances surrounding the collective-bargaining relationship." 7 Thus,
the Court allowed the Board some leeway in interpreting a contrac-
tual waiver. When the Board subsequently adopted its new deferral
standards,8 this "leeway" was effectively transferred to arbitrators,
the net result being a considerable role for arbitrators in defining the
parameters of a "clear and unmistakable" waiver.
0 The expansion of the Board's deferral policy not only gave arbi-
trators greater discretion in interpreting a contractual waiver, but also
created greater opportunities for arbitrators to exercise this discretion.
In 1971, the Board announced in Collyer Insulated Wire9 that it
would defer any claims that were covered by the collective bargaining
agreement, even if the arbitration process had not yet been under-
taken.'° Although this policy was initially extended to charges of vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act,1' in 1977, the Board reversed its
position with its holding in General American Transportation Corp.;2
therefore, at the time the Supreme Court decided Metropolitan
Edison, the Board did not defer to arbitrators in cases in which the
union alleged violations of Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act.
If an arbitrator had already made an award, the Board would defer
only if it determined on de novo consideration that the arbitrator had
disposed of the issues just as the Board would have.' 3 Less than one
year after Metropolitan Edison was decided, however, the Board sub-
stantially broadened its deferral policies on claims brought both
before and after an arbitral determination of the grievance. 4
Extending the Collyer doctrine, the Board held in United Technologies
Corp. that it would routinely defer claims alleging violations of Sub-
section 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) of the Act that had not yet been arbitrated
by the parties' own grievance machinery. 5 With regard to post-arbi-
tral deferral, the Board subsequently announced in Olin Manufactur-
ing, Inc. 16 that it would defer to an arbitrator's resolution of a
7. John Morrell & Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (1984); see Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at
708-09 & n. 13.
8. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
9. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
10. Id. at 839, 843. Although a matter is deferred to arbitration, the Board retains
jurisdiction to decide the issue in the event it is shown that: the dispute was not amicably
settled in arbitration; the procedures were not fair and regular; or the result reached was
repugnant to the Act. Id. at 843.
11. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972).
12. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
13. Professional Porter & Window Cleaning Co., Div. of Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136
(1982).
14. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
15. Id. at 558.
16. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
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grievance based on a Subsection 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) issue if the contrac-
tual issue was factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue and
if the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to
resolving the unfair labor practice.' 7 The Board did not require that
an arbitrator's award be totally consistent with Board precedent, as
long as the award was not "palpably wrong."18
In combination with the Supreme Court's decision in Metropoli-
tan Edison, the Board's easing of its deferral standards has put the
determination of unfair labor practices in disparate discipline cases
right.in the lap of arbitrators. Because disparate sanctioning of union
officials is an unfair labor practice only if the contract contains no
clear and unmistakable waiver of an official's right to be free from
discriminatory treatment,' 9 the arbitrator's resolution of the contrac-
tual grievance becomes, in effect, an adjudication of an unfair labor
practice question under the Act.
Given arbitrators' traditional focus on giving effect to the intent
of the parties in entering into collective bargaining agreements,2" as
well as arbitrators' relative lack of concern with public law and social
policies,2' several questions arise concerning the consequences of per-
mitting an arbitrator to decide unfair labor practice issues such as the
selective disciplining of union leaders. First, to what extent will the
values an arbitrator brings to the dispute resolution process be
17. Id. at 574.
18. Id. An arbitrator's decision is "palpably wrong" if it is not susceptible to any
interpretation consistent with the Act. Id. For an example of the application of the "any
interpretation consistent with the Act" standard, see infra notes 149-62 and accompanying
text.
19. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 709 (1983).
20. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 563 (1984) (Zimmerman, Member,
dissenting) (An arbitrator's function is to effectuate the parties' intent rather than to enforce
the Act.); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1301, 1303 (1971) (Talent, Arb.) (The
parties, not the arbitrator, make the contract.).
21. See Clinton Corn Processing Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 567 (1978) (Madden, Arb.)
("Securing to the parties the proper effect of their bargain is the sphere of the arbitrator;
securing to the parties the proper legal position from which to bargain is that of the National
Labor Relations Board."); Bucyrus-Erie Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 93, 99 (1977) (Lipson, Arb.)
(The contract rather than the law will determine the outcome of the arbitration.); see also
Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355, 384
(1983) ("[A]rbitrators are retained by the parties to decide cases on the basis of the collective
bargaining agreement and not as public judges to enforce external, public law."). For a
discussion of subsequent changes in arbitral attitudes, see infra notes 140-44 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the possible impact of arbitral determination of
statutory matters on the structure of the grievance arbitration, see Comment, Judicial
Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in the Search for a Well-
Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767, 797-98 (1988) (arguing that
arbitral consideration of statutory policy will result in a broader scope of judicial review,
fundamentally altering the private nature of arbitration).
[Vol. 44:443
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affected by the realization that, in the great majority of cases, resolu-
tion of the contractual issue will also be a final determination of the
unfair labor practice charge? Second, to what extent will the arbitra-
tor's values define the parameters of a "clear and unmistakable"
waiver? Third, will an arbitrally defined waiver standard adequately
protect union leaders from unfair labor practices? Finally, is the con-
trol of a statutory right through contract and private dispute resolu-
tion a proper arbitral function?
Section II of this Comment explores and contrasts the
approaches historically taken by arbitrators, the Board, and the
courts in resolving the question of selective sanctioning of union lead-
ers. Section III of this Comment discusses the arbitral values that
appear to inform an arbitrator's consideration of the selective disci-
pline issue. In Section IV, this Comment sets out two aspects of pub-
lic law that have intruded upon the private nature of arbitral
resolution of selective discipline cases-the Supreme Court's decision
in Metropolitan Edison and the Board's deferral policies. Section V
discusses the ways in which arbitrators' treatment of disparate sanc-
tions has evolved in response to these various factors. This Comment
then concludes in Section VI that, although the role of arbitrators is
somewhat altered by the imposition of external legal standards upon
the dispute resolution process in the arbitral forum, consideration of
external law by arbitrators is not incompatible with their role in
resolving private disputes. Further, because an unfair labor practice
claim is dependent upon a contractual interpretation of whether the
statutory right of union officials to be free from disparate discipline
has been waived, the issue of selective sanctioning is one best decided
by arbitrators.
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF SELECTIVE DISCIPLINE OF
UNION LEADERS
A. Arbitration
Arbitrators historically upheld the selective sanctioning of union
officials who violated the no-strike clause of a collective bargaining
agreement.22 Generally, arbitrators' decisions to uphold disparate
22. See, e.g., Hertz Corp., 81-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8012, at 3058 (1980) (Sabo,
Arb.); Zellerbach Paper Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1140, 1143-44 (1979) (Sabo, Arb.); Clinton
Corn, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 570; Gulf City Fisheries, 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8512,
at 5390 (1978) (King, Arb.); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 132,
78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8004, at 3018-19 (1977) (Hunter, Arb.); Cities Serv. Co., 60
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585, 594 (1973) (Blackmar, Arb.); Babcock, 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1304;
Acme Boot Co., 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585, 588 (1969) (Oppenheim, Arb.); American Hard
Rubber Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 155, 157 (1963) (Lehoczky, Arb.); see also Leahy,
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punishment were not based on specific contractual language, but
instead were justified under three distinct status-based theories that
linked a "higher duty" not to strike to the union leader's position. 3
Under the first theory, arbitrators viewed union officials as having a
greater duty to abide by the collective bargaining agreement and to
serve as an example to other union members.2 4 Under the second the-
ory, arbitrators imposed an affirmative duty on officials to actively
dissuade other employees from violating the agreement. In United
Parcels Service, Inc., 6 the arbitrator relied on both of these justifica-
tions for disciplining union officials more severely than the rank-and-
file:
If there is one principle that is universally recognized in the field of
industrial relations, it is that shop stewards have the highest duty
to faithfully adhere to all of the provisions of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement and to actively instruct each employee to do so
as well.... It is the obligation of the steward to set an example for
all Union members ... by demonstrating his loyalty to the terms
and conditions of the contract by his Union with the Employer.27
Under the third status-based theory, arbitrators considered union
representatives to be "leaders" by virtue of the office they held,
and thus more influential.2  Accordingly, union officials were sub-
ject to more severe discipline than other employees. 29 Litton Sys-
Arbitration, Union Stewards and Wildcat Strikes, 24 ARB, J. 50, 58 (1969) (discussing
arbitrator's view that a steward's failure to act to stop a wildcat strike is deserving of
punishment).
23. "Status-based" in this context refers to the notion that obligations inhere in the very
position of a union official; acceptance of the position is an acceptance of those obligations.
For a more detailed explanation of the status-based theories of selective discipline of union
officials, see Note, Discriminatory Discipline of Union Representatives for Breach of their
"Higher Duty" in Illegal Strikes, 1982 DUKE L.J. 900.
24. See, e.g., Powermatic/Houdaille, Inc., 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1245, 1248 (1976) (Byars,
Arb.); Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 72-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8604, at 5116 (1973)
(Karasick, Arb.); Babcock, 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1304.
25. See, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1038, 1040 (1981) (Wolff,
Arb.); Clinton Corn, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 565; International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 78-1
Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8004, at 3018.
26. 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100 (1966) (Schmertz, Arb.).
27. Id. at 1100.
28. Clinton Corn, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 565; Litton Sys., 71-1 Lab.Arb. Awards (CCH)
8215, at 3710 (1971) (Abernethy, Arb.).
29. Litton, 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8215, at 3711. Disparate discipline of the
leaders of a work stoppage is well accepted by both the Board and arbitrators. See, e.g.,
Lectromelt Casting & Mach. Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 696 (1986) (An employer may punish any
employee more severely for actual instigation of an unprotected strike.); Midwest Precision
Casting Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 597, 598 (1979) (Employees who provide leadership for an
unprotected strike may be subject to more severe discipline than other employees.);
Continental Can Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 11, 17 (1985) (Hunter, Arb.) (Instigating mass
refusal of overtime work would constitute just cause for disparate discipline.).
[Vol. 44:443
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terns3 illustrates this rationale for the imposition of higher duties on
union officials. The arbitrator in Litton stated:
Job Stewards and other Union officers are, by the very nature of
the positions which they hold, leaders in their Union commu-
nity .... When Union Stewards and other Union officers partici-
pate in an illegal walkout, by mere fact of that participation as
Union officials, they provide "leadership" support for the strike,
"leadership" which inescapably goes beyond the mere "following"
of other workmen who have no recognized and official leadership
positions in the Union.3 1
Whichever justifications arbitrators employed, the general
assumption was that management was entitled to treat union repre-
sentatives more harshly than rank-and-file union members for partici-
pation in an illegal work stoppage.32 This assumption may have
reflected arbitrators' concerns with both maintaining the stability of
labor relations within the particular bargaining unit and with making
the grievance process work for that unit, as opposed to reflecting gen-
eral concerns that the imposition of a higher duty might create disin-
centives to becoming a union leader.
33
B. The Board
The Board also initially permitted selective sanctioning of union
officials for violations of no-strike clauses. 34 The Board agreed with
arbitrators that officials had a greater duty than the rank-and-file to
comply with the terms of the contract.35 Unlike arbitrators, however,
the Board would not impose any duty on an official to prevent viola-
tions of the agreement by other employees. 36 The initial acceptance
by the Board of disparate discipline for union officials who violated
30. 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8215 (1971) (Abernethy, Arb.).
31. Id. at 3710-11.
32. W. BAER, THE LABOR ARBITRATION GUIDE 166 (1974); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 201-02 (4th ed. 1985).
33. For a discussion of the concern with union leadership, see infra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., University Overland Express, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 82, 92 (1960) (upheld
discipline of union steward for violating "higher duty"); Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 84
N.L.R.B. 629, 643 (1949) (failure to attempt to avert strike was breach of official's "greater
duty" to uphold contract).
35. University Overland, 129 N.L.R.B. at 92.
36. Pontiac Motors Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 413, 415 (1961). The basis for the distinction
between the duty to comply and the duty to ensure that others comply may be that, while an
official's greater duty to comply with the terms of the agreement derives from a duty placed on
all employees, an official's duty to actively dissuade others from breaching the terms of the
contract represents a completely separate affirmative obligation. Note, supra note 23, at 905-
06.
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the no-strike clause of the agreement may have been an attempt by
the Board to paint the most desirable image of the roles of each of the
parties in the collective bargaining process.37 According to this
image, the union relinquished the right to strike in exchange for a
grievance arbitration process. The Board thus may have viewed a
union leader's obligation to preserve the ideal image as part of the
exchange.3
The Board abandoned a status-based justification for discrimina-
tory discipline of union officials with its holding in Precision Castings
Co., 3 9 and seemed to adopt instead a contractually-based theory for
defining the duties of union officials.' Nevertheless, apparently disre-
garding the contractually-imposed duty of union officials to attempt
to restore normal operations in the event of a work stoppage, and the
Board held simply that a union official could not be "held to a greater
degree of responsibility for participating in the strike," because "dis-
crimination directed against an employee on the basis of his or her
holding union office is contrary to the plain meaning of Section
8(a)(3)."' The Board's narrow view of the possible contractual
waiver of a union leader's Section 8(a)(3) rights,4 2 coupled with its
subsequent decisions on the issue,4 3 indicate that the Board had not
really embraced a contractual image of the relationship between the
employer and the union official." Rather, an employee's status as a
37. See Pontiac Motors, 132 N.L.R.B. at 415.
38. In 1961, a federal court would not grant injunctive relief to enforce a no-strike clause
in a collective bargaining agreement. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 196 (1962).
In Sinclair Ref, the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) prohibited the issuance of such an injunction. The Court reversed
its position in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
After Boys Markets, a federal court could force employees to use arbitration procedures rather
than engage in work stoppages. Id. at 253. Thus, the need to put pressure on union officials in
order to protect the ideal vision of labor relations through differential sanctions was lessened.
39. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
40. See id. at 183; Comment, New Proscriptions Against Selective Discipline of Union
Officials: Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 27 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 361, 363 & n.12
(1984).
41. Precision Castings, 233 N.L.R.B. at 184.
42. Id.
43. Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978) (Discharge of steward was not validated by
contract clause that placed duty on union official to end illegal strike.), enforcement denied,
612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Consolidation Coal Co., 263
N.L.R.B. 1306 (1982) (Disparate treatment of union officials on the basis of their union office
was patently discriminatory under the Act, whether or not disparate punishment was meted
out as a consequence of an alleged breach of a higher contractual duty.).
44. See Gould, 237 N.L.R.B. at 881; Consolidation Coal, 263 N.L.R.B. at 1306; see also
N.L.R.B. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1982) (Board's legal view
that disparate discipline can never be imposed is equivalent of per se rule that union officers'
protected status cannot be bargained away.).
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union official was still an important consideration, but the underlying
policies had shifted toward protecting both the union leader and the
union's internal political autonomy in defining the role of its officials
without employer interference.45 For example, in Gould Corp.,46 the
Board appeared to forbid the selective sanctioning of union officials
per se, holding that any such action by an employer was a violation of
an employee's statutory rights under Subsections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)
of the Act.47 Unlike arbitrators, whose role is basically one of con-
tract interpretation,4" the Board functions as a protector of employ-
ees' statutory rights.4 9 Therefore, unlike many arbitrators, the Board
was not willing to sacrifice those rights for the possible productivity
gains associated with selective sanctioning.5 "
C. The Courts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Edison,
the federal courts of appeals disagreed as to whether it was permissi-
ble to selectively discipline union officials for participating in unau-
thorized work stoppages.5 In deciding the selective discipline issue,
the courts looked toward Congress' intent to encourage peaceful and
45. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1982); Gould Corp., 237
N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
890 (1980); Precision Casting Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
46. 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
47. Id. at 881. The Board held that harsher punishment of a union steward who had
joined an illegal work stoppage was "not validated by a contract clause that specifie[d] the
responsibilities of union officers" during strikes. Id.
48. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960);
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955).
49. See Comment, New Proscriptions Against Selective Discipline of Union Officials:
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 27 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 361, 363 & n.12 (1984).
50. Consolidation Coal Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 1306, 1310 (1982) (The Board stated that "the
fundamental statutory right of employees to support and assist labor organizations by
becoming union officers cannot be sacrificed to a contractual right of employers to be free from
unauthorized work stoppages.").
51. In Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 232 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980), the Seventh Circuit held that harsher discipline of union officials
was justified by the greater duty of officials to enforce the union's obligations. This rationale
was also accepted by the Third Circuit in Gould, 612 F.2d at 732-33 and by the Eighth Circuit
in NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc., 638 F.2d 51, 55 (8th Cir. 1981). Both cases cite Indiana &
Michigan extensively. Gould, however, was ultimately decided on the basis of the language in
the collective bargaining agreement. 612 F.2d at 733. In contrast to a status justification, the
Fifth and D.C. Circuits applied a contractual waiver theory. See NLRB v. South Cent. Bell
Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982) (disparate sanctioning not permitted absent specific
contractual obligations); Szewczuga v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("collective
bargaining process had explicitly established higher duties for union officials"). The Third and
Seventh Circuits subsequently adopted this rationale in later decisions. See Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 693 (1983); Hammermill
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:443
productive labor relations through the collective bargaining process."
Their decisions seem to reflect an attempt to effectuate the congres-
sional desire to promote industrial stability and productivity.53
Those courts that found that selective discipline was justified by
the higher duty of a union official to comply with the no-strike provi-
sion in the agreement did not consider the practice to be inherently
destructive of any protected employee right;5 4 therefore, following the
Supreme Court's analysis in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. , the
federal appellate courts initially held that the function of discrimina-
tory discipline in preventing or limiting illegal disruptions of business
outweighed any ill-effects on the union.56 In later rejecting the notion
that higher duties inhered in the position of a union official and
instead adopting a contractual waiver theory, the courts did not cease
to recognize that selective sanctioning may have peace and productiv-
ity value.57 Rather, the courts shifted the legal entitlement to the
union, forcing management to bargain with the union if it wished to
reserve this additional method of ensuring compliance with the no-
strike clause.5" Without sacrificing whatever productivity value the
practice of selective disciplining held for employers, the courts thus
protected the bargaining position of unions and gave effect to Con-
gress' intent to protect the freedom of employees to engage in union
Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 163-65 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983);
C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1981).
52. Congress' intent is easily determinable from Section 203(d) of the Act, which
provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d). For further discussion of the purposes of the Act, see infra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text.
53. In fact, courts that applied a status-based justification for imposing higher duties on
union officials to abide by the terms of the agreement may not have promoted industrial peace
and productivity. See infra note 144.
54. See, e.g., Armour-Dial, 638 F.2d at 55; Gould, 612 F.2d at 733; Indiana & Michigan,
599 F.2d at 232.
55. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). Under Great Dane, if an employer's discriminatory conduct is
"inherently destructive" of employee rights, union animus may be inferred and an unfair labor
practice found unless the employer can prove a legitimate business purpose for the conduct. If,
however, the employer's discrimination has only a "comparatively slight" effect on employee
rights, and serves a legitimate business purpose, the burden of proving union animus falls to
the complainant. Id. at 33.
56. See Armour-Dial, 638 F.2d at 55; Gould, 612 F.2d at 733; Indiana & Michigan, 599
F.2d at 229-30.
57. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S.
693 (1983); Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1080 (1983).
58. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (Court gave initial
entitlement to be free from discriminatory discipline to union).
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activities. 9
III. TRADITIONAL ARBITRAL VALUES INFORMING SELECTIVE
DISCIPLINE DECISIONS
Arbitral decisions in disparate discipline cases decided prior to
Metropolitan Edison reveal several recurring concerns including con-
tinued productivity, 6° management's right to run the business, 6' the
integrity of the collective bargaining process, 6z and the parties'
expectations.63
A. Productivity
One of the primary purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act was to preserve industrial peace in order to promote productiv-
ity.' National labor policy has established collective bargaining as
the primary means of accomplishing this goal,65 and Section 203(d) of
the Act declares arbitration to be the most desirable method for the
settlement of grievances in the collective bargaining scheme.66
Because the system within which arbitrators function was developed
as a means to minimize industrial strife and increase productivity in
59. Id.; see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984) (In enacting Section
7 of the Act, Congress intended to equalize the bargaining power of the employee and the
employer by allowing employees to "band together.").
60. See, e.g., Hertz Corp., 81-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8012, at 3054 (1980) (Sabo,
Arb.); Zellerbach Paper Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1140, 1142 (1979) (Sabo, Arb.).
61. See, e.g., Specialty Paper Box Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 120, 125 (1968) (Nathanson,
Arb.).
62. See infra notes 97-103.
63. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 132, 78-1 Lab.
Arb. Awards (CCH) 8004, at 3018-19 (1977) (Hunter, Arb.) (The union stewards did not act
the way union officials are expected to act.); American Hard Rubber Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
155, 157 (1963) (Lehoczky, Arb.) (The failure of union officials to act as expected represented
the most important contract violation.).
64. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666, 674 (1980) (Preserving the flow of interstate commerce by establishing and
maintaining industrial peace was the primary goal of the NLRA.).
65. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 674; see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465
U.S. 822, 833-34 (1984) (The purposes of the Act explicitly include the encouragement of
collective bargaining.); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (The goal of national labor policy is to minimize industrial strife by
encouraging collective bargaining.).
66. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) ("[A]rbitrators under... collective bargaining agreements are
indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process."); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-82 (1960) (Arbitration of labor disputes
under the collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process.).
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the American workplace,67 it is not surprising that these values are so
important to the arbitrators who play a vital role in that system. The
opinion of the arbitrator in Sprayon Products, Inc.68 illustrates the
importance arbitrators place on productivity in the workplace. In
Sprayon, a supervisor asked an employee to remove from the produc-
tion area a tape recorder that the employee had brought to work.6 9
The employee complained to a union official who instructed the
employee to disregard the supervisor's order.7" A relatively minor but
prolonged disruption ensued.7 ' The recorder was passed from
employee to employee, including two union officials, throughout the
course of the day.7 2 Management discharged the participating
employees who subsequently filed grievances contesting the disci-
pline.73 At the arbitration proceedings the arbitrator found that,
although no actual loss in production was proven conclusively, the
concerted actions of the grievants were a departure from the norm
and tantamount to a work stoppage.74 The arbitrator stated:
If there is anything clear .... it is that there was an awful lot, if
not an inordinate amount of employee non-production activity
going on that evening, in total disregard Of any notion of the con-
cept of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay," or that "working
time is for work," or the Union's own assurance of "a full day's
work on the part of its members ....
Clearly, concerted work stoppages in violation of the no-strike clause
were viewed by arbitrators as extremely serious offenses. 76 Manage-
ment claimed that punishing union officials more harshly than others
who participated in a work stoppage was necessary to ensure compli-
ance with the no-strike clause of the agreement. 7 Therefore, prior to
Metropolitan Edison, arbitrators may have been inclined to give man-
agement the tools it purportedly needed to prevent such interruptions
in production.
67. See supra notes 64-66.
68. 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) T 8031 (1979) (Dyke, Arb.).
69. Id. at 3121.
70. Id. at 3130.
71. Id. at 3131.
72. id.
73. Id. at 3128.
74. Id. at 3129.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 227, 230 (1987)
(Madden, Arb.) (restrictions on production a serious matter); Clinton Corn Processing Co., 71
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 563 (1978) (Madden, Arb.) (concerted work stoppages viewed as one of
most serious industrial offenses).
77. See American Enka Co., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8229, at 4024 (1983) (Jedel,
Arb.); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1301, 1303-04 (1971) (Talent, Arb.).
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B. Management's Right to Run the Business
Accepting management's productivity rationale, arbitrators con-
strued the practice of selectively sanctioning union officials as a per-
missible exercise of management's rights under the no-strike clause.7"
Management's right to discharge and discipline was generally seen as
limited only by federal and state labor relations acts and applicable
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.7 9 If the agreement
expressly addressed management's right to discipline, but placed no
restrictions on this right, arbitrators might nevertheless imply a just
cause limitation. 0 Any such limitation notwithstanding, disparate
punishment of union officials often was found to be for just cause
because the union representative had engaged in activities for which
any employee could be punished under the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.8' Further, once an arbitrator found that just
cause existed for discipline, many agreements provided that the
degree of discipline was strictly a matter of employer discretion."
For example, Gulf City Fisheries, Inc. ,83 involved the singling-out and
discharge of a local union president for her part in a work stoppage.84
In that case, the restrooms at a seafood processing plant were inopera-
tive, interfering with the employees' ability to wash up or use the
facilities during their break.8 5 The local union president called the
union business agent who told her to tell the employees to "stay put";
she followed these instructions.86  Approximately one hour later,
when water was restored to the restrooms, the employees returned to
work.87 The local union president was later discharged for her con-
78. See Sprayon, 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8031, at 3131 (Disparate discipline of
officials upheld when officials, as well as other employees, engaged in actions tantamount to
work stoppage); Zellerbach Paper Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1140, 1144 (1979) (Sabo, Arb.)
(upheld company's decision disciplining union officials who should have acted to prevent
violation of no-strike agreement, but not disciplining other employees who took part in the
work stoppage); Clinton Corn, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 565 (union officials' passivity and silence
in the face of a work stoppage justified selective discipline).
79. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 32, at 610-11.
80. Id.; see also Zellerbach Paper, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1142 ("[E]ven where a contract
fails to include any general limitations as to the right to discharge, Arbitrators have concluded
that a just cause restriction is implied in a modem Collective Bargaining Agreement .
81. See cases cited supra note 22.
82. See, e.g., Gulf City Fisheries, Inc., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 11 8512, at 5390
(1978) (King, Arb.); see also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 32, at 667-68, 668 n.91
(discussion of authority of arbitrators to modify penalties).
83. 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8512 (1978) (King, Arb.).
84. Id. at 5390.
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duct."8 At the grievance hearing, the arbitrator found that the
employees' action constituted a work stoppage that interfered with
the company's production.8 9  Further, the arbitrator found that
because of the grievant's position as local president, and because she
possessed natural leadership qualities that were recognized by her fel-
low employees, she had more responsibility for the work stoppage
than other employees.9" Thus, there was just cause for discipline.
The arbitrator, however, was not convinced that the severity of the
discipline was predicated upon only the reasons stated by the com-
pany at the hearing. 9' Nevertheless, once he found that some disci-
pline was justified, he stated that he had no authority under the
contract to judge the appropriateness of the degree of discipline.92 If
some discipline was justified, then the specific extent of the discipline
was a prerogative reserved to management under the contract.
93
An arbitrator's assumption of retained management rights, com-
bined with the apparent management goal of increased productivity,
provided a strong justification for the practice of disparate punish-
ment. Selective discipline was not seen as arbitrary or capricious
because it had a basis in logic 94-albeit management's logic. While
concern with productivity and management rights clearly influenced
arbitrators' determinations of the issue, the language in arbitral deci-
sions indicates that philosophic concerns may have exerted some
influence as well.
C. Integrity of the Collective Bargaining Process
Arbitrators believe in the efficacy of the dispute resolution pro-
cess of which they are a part. Upholding "industrial law and order"
facilitates the economic effort and permits greater prosperity for
88. Id.
89. Id. at 5389.
90. Id. at 5390.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Gulf City arbitrator's reliance on contractual limitations to justify his refusal
to examine management's possible ulterior motives for disparately disciplining the local's
president is disturbing to proponents of a tighter deferral policy. These proponents fear the
situation will occur more frequently if statutory issues are permitted to be resolved in the
context of private arbitration and contract interpretation. This fear, however, appears to be
largely unfounded, both because proper application of the present deferral standards would
prevent such a result, see Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, 278 N.L.R.B. 713 (1986), and because
arbitrators have become more willing to interpret contracts within the context of broader
statutory policies, see infra notes 140-44.
93. Gulf City, 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8512, at 5388.
94. See Clinton Corn Processing Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 564 (1978) (Madden,
Arb.).
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employees and employers alike. 95 To have its greatest effect, however,
the collective bargaining agreement must be accorded full respect by
both parties.96 If the parties are free to disregard the provisions of the
contract, the system cannot function. 97
Union officials serve one of the parties to the contract in a repre-
sentative capacity. 98 In that capacity, they represent the union both
to its members and to management. 99 A union representative thus
has obligations to his constituents,"° and some would argue to his
employer as well. 1 ' In addition, some arbitrators seem to impose
upon union officials an obligation to the agreement-to the process of
collective bargaining in which the official chose to take a leading
role.'02 It is the union official's abandonment of his obligation to pre-
serve the integrity of the process which constitutes the greater wrong
in the eyes of some arbitrators. 10 3 The importance arbitrators place
on protecting the collective bargaining process is apparent in the lan-
guage they use. Arbitrators have variously described union officials as
"custodians of the Agreement" and "guardians of its rights,"" and
as holding positions of "honor and trust."' 0 5 Union officials have
pledged their "loyalty"' 6 and "honor,"'0 7 and have the "highest duty
to faithfully adhere"' 08 to all the provisions of the agreement. They
must preserve the "sanctity"' 0 9 and "uphold the integrity"" 0 of the
contract. To do otherwise would be "violative of their trust.""'
95. Id. at 563; see also Associated Wholesale Grocers, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 227, 230
(1987) (Madden, Arb.).
96. See Bucyrus-Erie Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 93, 99 (1977) (Lipson, Arb.); McConway
& Torley Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 31, 36 (1970) (Cohen, Arb.).
97. See Bucyrus-Erie, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 98-99.
98. See American Hard Rubber Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 155, 157 (1963) (Lehoczky,
Arb.) (union officials represent union management to the employees).
99. McConway & Torley, 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 35.
100. Id.; Acme Boot Co., 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585, 588 (1969) (Oppenheim, Arb.).
101. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585, 592 (1973) (Blackmar, Arb.);
Acme Boot, 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 588.
102. See Mack Trucks, 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1240, 1243 (1964) (Wallen, Arb.).
103. See Litton Sys., 71-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8215, at 3711 (1971) (Abernethy,
Arb.); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1301, 1304 (1971) (Talent, Arb.).
104. Mack Trucks, 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1243.
105. McConway & Torley Corp., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 31, 35 (1970) (Cohen, Arb.).
106. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100, 1100 (1966) (Schmertz, Arb.).
107. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1038, 1041 (1981) (Wolff, Arb.).
108. United Parcel, 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1100.
109. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1301, 1303-04 (1971) (Talent, Arb.).
110. United Parcel, 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1101.
111. Sprayon Prods., Inc., 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8031, at 3131 (1979) (Dyke,
Arb.). One might note that although arbitrators were apparently unwilling to allow
management to take direct action against union officials for failing to abide by and protect the
integrity of the collective bargaining agreement, unions do not have similar direct recourse
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In addition, some arbitrators maintained that union officials, in
contrast to the rank-and-file, have or should have greater knowledge
and familiarity with the working provisions of the agreement because
of their representative positions." 2 By participating in an illegal work
stoppage, union officials exhibit a conscious disregard for the contrac-
tual provisions that were agreed to in good faith through the collec-
tive bargaining process. This knowing disregard makes an illegally
striking union representative more culpable than the ordinary
employee, and greater punishment is therefore justified. In American
Hard Rubber Co.," ' 3 for example, the arbitrator upheld the discharges
of two committeemen who walked out with other employees when the
employer posted the next week's schedule late. 4  The arbitrator
noted that the committeemen "were [presumably] fully aware of their
obligations under the terms of the Agreement."" ' 5 Their deliberate
act of personally walking off the job and their complete disregard for
their duties as union officials were thus compounded and justified
more severe discipline." 6
D. Expectations of the Parties
When interpreting a contract, an arbitrator attempts to discern
the intent of the parties as revealed by the contractual language, past
practice, and industry custom." 7 Historically, selective sanctioning
was treated fairly consistently by arbitrators." I Therefore, arbitrators
may have come to assume that this practice was accepted by the par-
ties, absent any indications to the contrary. Arbitrators also may have
been somewhat reluctant to rule in a manner contrary to previous
selective sanctioning decisions. "' While not bound by precedent,
against management personnel who violate the terms of the contract. If a supervisor violates
the collective bargaining agreement, only management may punish him directly-the rationale
being that control of its employees is strictly a matter of management rights. By the same
logic, one might argue that unions should also have the exclusive right to discipline their
"employees"-tinion officials. Union autonomy is no less important than management rights;
a union's obligation to protect the integrity of the parties' agreement should be no greater than
that of management.
112. Babcock & Wilcox, 56 Lab. ,Arb. (BNA) at 1304; McConway & Torley Corp., 55 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 31, 35 (1970) (Cohen, Arb.); American Hard Rubber Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
155, 157 (1963) (Lehoczky, Arb.)..
113. 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 155 (1963) (Lehoczky, Arb.).
114. Id. at 156-57.
115. Id. at 157.
116. Seeid.
117. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
118. See supra note 22.
119. See, e.g., American Enka Co., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8229, at 4023 (1983)
(Jedel, Arb.).
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arbitrators recognized the value of consistency and predictability of
result in the bargaining process;120 therefore, as long as the earlier
decision was reasonable, an arbitrator may have been unwilling to
upset it.' 2 ' Prior to Metropolitan Edison, consideration of productiv-
ity, management's rights, the integrity of the collective bargaining
process, and the parties' expectations led arbitrators to conclude in
many cases that selective sanctioning of union officials for violations
of a no-strike clause was permissible under the collective bargaining
agreement. 
22
IV. ARBITRATION IN RELATION TO EXTERNAL LAW
Metropolitan Edison and routine deferral to arbitration have
redefined the problems of selective sanctioning for arbitrators. Thus,
a consideration of new values and a reassessment of the old is neces-
sary. In the context of collective bargaining, arbitration originated as
a method of purely private dispute resolution. 123 Typically, an arbi-
trator viewed himself as a "creature of the agreement," limited to
interpreting its terms within the context of past practice and the
"common law of the shop."' 124 An arbitrator had no power outside
that granted him by the contract. 125 Because he was confined to inter-
preting the terms of the agreement, the arbitrator was relatively
unconcerned with the external law.126 He had been retained for the
purpose of resolving a private contractual dispute; if any statutory
issues arose, that resolution was better left for another forum.
127
120. See id.; F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 32, at 430-32.
121. See American Enka, 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8229, at 4023.
122. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
123. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
124. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 56 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1301, 1303 (1971) (Talent, Arb.). The
"common law of the shop" is made up of the "practices, assumptions, understandings, and
aspirations of the going industrial concern." Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1500 (1959).
125. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 93, 99 (1977) (Lipson, Arb.) ("[A]n arbitrator
must be bound by the 'four corners' of the contract ... :"); Babcock & Wilcox, 56 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) at 1303 ("The Arbitrator should remember that he is but a creature of [the] agreement
126. See Clinton Corn Processing Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 567 (1978) (Madden,
Arb.); Bucyrus-Erie, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 99 ("[I]t is the contract, rather than the law that
will determine the [outcome]."); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 32, at 336-39.
127. As the arbitrator stated in Clinton Corn: "Securing to the parties the proper effect of
their bargain is the sphere of the arbitrator; securing to the parties the proper legal position
from which to bargain is that of the National Labor Relations Board." 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at
567.
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A. Waiver
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Metro-
politan Edison, an arbitrator may no longer be free to confine his
attention solely to the parties' private agreement when deciding a dis-
criminatory discipline claim. In Metropolitan Edison, the Court
established an external standard for determining whether the parties
intended to waive their statutory rights through collective bargain-
ing. Theoretically, arbitrators are not bound by law external to the
contract, such as court precedent; therefore, they would not necessar-
ily have to apply Metropolitan Edison's "clear and unmistakable"
waiver standard. In reality, however, an arbitral award that com-
pletely failed to conform to that requirement would likely meet with
non-deferral by the Board.129 An arbitrator who chose to ignore the
applicable law in these circumstances would be "remiss in his respon-
sibility to the parties [to render] a 'final and binding' decision." 1
30
Accordingly, arbitrators must look outside the collective bargaining
agreement in order to determine the proper standard for interpreting
the meaning of the agreement.
Although the Metropolitan Edison standard for waiver was
"clear and unmistakable,"'' the Supreme Court was ambiguous as to
the extent to which arbitrators may rely on factors outside the lan-
guage of the agreement in making that determination. 32 Judge Harry
T. Edwards133 resolves the Metropolitan Edison ambiguity in light of
the Supreme Court's opinion in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Rub-
ber Workers. ' In W.R. Grace, the Court stated that courts must
enforce an arbitral award as long as it draws its essence from the
agreement, although the basis for the arbitrator's decision may be
128. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
129. See, e.g., John Morrell & Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 1 (1984). In John Morrell, the NLRB
refused to defer to the arbitrator's decision because the arbitrator did not interpret the parties'
agreement to find that it imposed an explicit duty on union officials to make efforts to end
unlawful work stoppages. Id. Instead, the arbitrator based his decision on the union leader's
status. Id.
130. American Enka Co., 83-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8229, at 4024 (1983) (Jedel,
Arb.).
131. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 708.
132. The Supreme Court noted that prior arbitration decisions may be relevant in
interpreting bargaining agreements. In a footnote, the Court noted that "[a]n arbitration
decision may be relevant to establishing waiver . . . when the arbitrator has stated that the
bargaining agreement itself clearly and unmistakably imposes an explicit duty on union
officials to end unlawful work stoppages." Id. at 708-09, 709 n.13.
133. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way
Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23, 39 (1985).
134. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
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ambiguous.I35 Judge Edwards has suggested that the Court's opinion
in W.R. Grace cannot be reconciled with an interpretation of Metro-
politan Edison that requires an arbitrator's decision to be based on
explicit contractual language. 36 Taking a similar but less liberal
view, the Board interpreted Metropolitan Edison to say that waiver
may be established by circumstances surrounding the collective bar-
gaining relationship, as well as by the language of the agreement
itself. 37 Thus, the imposition of external law on the arbitral determi-
nation of what constitutes a waiver of an official's Section 8(a)(3)
rights restricts, but probably does not eliminate, the opportunity for
arbitral interpretation of the contract.
B. Deferral
The deferral standards of the Board also give an arbitrator room
to interpret the collective bargaining agreement according to his own
view of the circumstances. An arbitrator need not decide a case the
way the Board would have decided if it had been reviewing the case
on the merits. 3 ' Under Olin Corp., the arbitrator will not be over-
ruled by the Board unless his decision is palpably wrong-that is,
unless his decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent
with the Act.'39 In conjunction, Metropolitan Edison and the Board's
deferral policy leave a fair amount of discretion to the arbitrator to
determine whether there has been a waiver of statutory rights, and
thus whether there has been any unfair labor practice.
V. EvOLUTION OF THE ARBITRAL APPROACH TO THE
DISPARATE SANCTIONING ISSUE
Once put in the position of deciding unfair labor practice claims,
arbitrators may have felt compelled to consider more closely the stat-
utory entitlements involved and the policies underlying those entitle-
ments."4  Since Metropolitan Edison was decided, an increased
concern with the Act and its underlying statutory policies, as well as
135. Id. at 764 (citing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960)).
136. Edwards, supra note 133, at 390.
137. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1540, 1541-42 (1985).
138. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
139. Id. For an example of the application of the "palpably wrong" standard, see infra
notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Warren Gen. Hosp., 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8571, at 5398 (1986)
(Duff, Arb.) (reflecting statutory policy of not discouraging employee participation in union
activities); Continental Can Co., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 11, 16-18 (1985) (Hunter, Arb.) (directly
addressing statutory issue and citing court and NLRB precedent extensively). But see
Schnadig Corp., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 692, 699-700 (1985) (Seidman, Arb.) (refusing to base
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with court precedents, has been apparent in arbitral opinions dealing
with the discriminatory punishment of union officials.1 4' Arbitrators
have become more aware of problems such as equality of adversarial
bargaining positions and free participation in union activities- con-
cepts arising from the Act.'42 When weighed against these concerns,
the productivity value of selective sanctioning may not seem as com-
pelling. 43  In fact, some arbitators have recognized that selective
sanctions may actually undermine the integrity of the collective bar-
gaining process.'" As a result, although the values that an arbitrator
traditionally brought to the process are still important, they now must
be balanced against other considerations as well.
Although arbitrators have moved away from their prior pro-
management view of this issue, '45 it does not necessarily follow that
ruling on anything outside the contract, but ruling in accordance with the Board and other
case law).
141. See cases cited supra note 140.
142. Warren; 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8571, at 5400 (The possibility of more severe
discipline would be likely to discourage employees from holding union office.); Continental
Can, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 16 (citing statute and court precedent extensively).
143. In fact, the productivity rationale for selective discipline may have been no more than
an excuse to display management's might. For example, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693 (1983), members of the Electrical Workers union refused to cross an
informational picket line that had been set up by an unrelated union. Id. at 696. Although the
union officials were instructed to cross the picket line, they refused to do so, believing that the
other employees were unlikely to follow. Id. Instead, the officials worked diligently to arrange
a compromise between management and the other union so that the picket line could be
disbanded. Id. at 696-97. Although the union officials were successful in negotiating a
settlement that resulted in the return to work by members of the Electrical Workers union, the
officials were nevertheless punished more severely than other employees for their part in the
work stoppage. Id. at 697. Clearly, in this case, using differential sanctions to discourage this
type of conduct by union officials-conduct that undoubtedly facilitated an early resolution of
the strike-was counterproductive. What was accomplished, however, was an unmistakable
show of management's authority.
144. Warren, 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8571, at 5400; Continental Can, 86 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) at 17. In Metropolitan Edison, the Court discussed selective discipline's possible
deleterious effect on the collective bargaining process. 460 U.S. at 702-05. The Court noted
that if union officials were to comply with management's demands in a work stoppage
situation, they might well lose the respect and support of the union members. Id. at 705. In
addition, the unilateral imposition of selective discipline might adversely affect the collective
bargaining system by impinging on the union's autonomy. As the Court stated, the collective
bargaining process presupposes " 'contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and
concepts of self-interest.' " Id. at 704 (quoting General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 394 (1982) (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477,
488 (1960))). "Congress has sought to ensure the integrity of this process by preventing both
management and labor's representatives from being coerced in the performance of their official
duties." Id. Using the Court's analysis, one might easily conclude that any short-term
productivity benefits produced by the unilateral imposition of selective sanctions would be
offset by the long-term damage to union cohesiveness and union autonomy-fundamental
principles of the collective bargaining process.
145. See supra note 140.
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their concern for employee statutory rights is as great as the concern
of the NLRB because, unlike the NLRB, an arbitrator's primary
function is not protecting statutory entitlements. 146 Nevertheless, the
Olin standard of deferral permits an arbitrator to substitute his judg-
ment for that of the Board when deciding the contractual/unfair
labor practice issue. Moreover, although it is no longer "universally
recognized in the field of industrial relations" '' that a union official,
solely because of his status, merits greater punishment for participat-
ing in a work stoppage than an ordinary employee, some remnants
of this longstanding, pro-management view undoubtedly remain. 14 8
Under the present system, some of these status-based justifications for
selective discipline may still be interjected into an arbitrator's decision
without rendering it "palpably wrong" under Olin. As a result, the
threshold for establishing a waiver in the arbitral forum may be lower
than before the NLRB. For example, in Brunswick Corp., 1 9 which
was decided prior to Olin, the contractual provision at issue stated
that "neither [the union] nor its officers, representatives, committee-
men, Stewards, nor its members will for any reason ... call, sanction,
or engage in any strike." 150 Characterizing this provision of the con-
tract as a general no-strike clause, the Board refused to find that this
language constituted a valid waiver of union officials' statutory rights
because it failed to meet the Metropolitan Edison "clear and unmis-
takable" requirement. 1 In direct contrast, the arbitrator in Davis &
Geck interpreted virtually identical contractual language as sufficient
evidence of the union's intent to waive the stautory protection of its
officers.' 52 The language of the no-strike clause read as follows:
"[n]either the Union, its officers or members, shall instigate, call,
sanction, condone, or participate in any strikes."' 53 The arbitrator
interpreted the word "condone" as applying solely to union leaders
because "condone" usually connotes an act taken by a higher author-
146. See, e.g., Schnadig Corp., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 692, 699-700 (1985) (Seidman, Arb.)
(An arbitrator's decision is strictly based upon a contract; it is unaffected by federal statutes or
judicial or administrative interpretation of such federal statutes.); Clinton Corn Processing
Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 567 (1978) (Madden, Arb.) (Securing the proper effect of a
bargain is an arbitrator's role; securing the proper legal position from which to bargain is the
role of the Board.).
147. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1100, 1100 (1966) (Schmertz, Arb.).
148. See, e.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 227, 231 (1987)
(Madden, Arb.) ("The steward has greater responsibility to abide by the labor agreement and
to encourage others to do so.").
149. 267 N.L.R.B. 457 (1983).
150. Id. at 458 n.1 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 457.
152. See Davis & Geck, 14 NLRB Advice Mem. Rep. (LRP) 24033 (1987).
153. Id. at 5319 (emphasis added).
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ity.' 54 Therefore, under this interpretation, union leaders had specifi-
cally undertaken a greater contractual duty than the rank-and-file not
to "condone" work stoppages; the violation of this duty justified the
disparate punishment.1 5 After considering the arbitrator's opinion,
the Associate General Counsel for the NLRB issued an advice memo-
randum advising deference to the arbitral award, 15 6 stating that the
arbitrator's interpretation was "not unreasonable." 15 7 Further, in a
footnote, the Associate General Counsel noted that the word "sanc-
tion," as well as "condone," implied an action taken by union officials
rather than by its members.15 8 Thus, for all practical purposes, the
contractual language subject to interpretation was the same in both
Davis & Geck and Brunswick. Despite the fact that the Board's inter-
pretation of this language was directly opposed to the arbitrator's
interpretation of that same language, the Associate General Counsel
determined that the standard for deferral under Olin had been met-
that is, because the arbitrator had implicitly found a valid contractual
waiver as required by Metropolitan Edison,159 disciplining only the
union official for "condoning" the work stoppage was lawful and not
repugnant to the Act.' 60 As the comparison of these two cases illus-
trates, routine deferral to arbitral determinations of the selective disci-
pline issue may result in a corruption, or at least a broadening, of the
"clear and unmistakable" waiver requirement, and thus may provide
less protection for employees' statutory rights than was envisioned by
the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison. Pre-arbitral deferral
under United Technologies Corp."'6 may further exacerbate the situa-
tion by severely limiting the unions' access to NLRB review of the
merits of a grievance.162
It has been charged that the NLRB's present deferral policies, as
discussed above, represent an abdication of its duty to protect
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5318.
157. Id. at 5319.
158. Id. at 5320 n.12.
159. Id. at 5319. The Associate General Counsel recognized that the relevant language
"arguably could be interpreted as not meeting the Metropolitan Edison waiver standards," id.,
but concluded that the arbitrator's interpretation was reasonable, and under that
interpretation, the waiver standard was met. Id.
160. Id.
161. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
162. A stricter pre-arbitration deferral policy, however, may permit forum shopping by the
parties. If NLRB deferral is not relatively automatic, a party may look to the forum more
likely to be sympathetic to its cause. Furthermore, if unions perceive the Board as more
sympathetic than arbitrators to the their position on the selective discipline issue, unions may
abandon the arbitral forum when this type of dispute is involved.
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employee statutory rights. 63 Although this may be true to a limited
extent, the NLRB may still review arbitral decisions that do not meet
the Olin standards."6 A stricter standard of review for deferral to
arbitration, such as existed under Propoco, Inc.,65 would require the
Board to review each case on its merits to determine whether its
deferral standard had been met, thereby resulting in repetitive litiga-
tion. Moreover, in cases of selective discipline of union officials, the
statutory issue is dependent upon a contractual interpretation-a
traditional arbitral function. Applying a Propoco deferral standard
might usurp the function of the arbitrator and undermine his role in
the collective bargaining process. On the other hand, the present
Board policy encourages recognition of the arbitration process as an
important part of the national labor policy by requiring the parties to
resolve disputes through the machinery that they voluntarily created
for that purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present waiver and deferral policies have resulted in some
tension in delineating the appropriate functions of arbitrators and the
Board in resolving disputes involving the selective sanctioning of
union leaders who participate in a work stoppage. That tension
would not be eliminated by tightening the deferral policies; the pur-
ported usurpation of function would simply shift. Metropolitan
Edison declared the resolution of the discriminatory discipline issue to
be contractually based in that whether the imposition of more severe
sanctions on union officials constitutes an unfair labor practice
depends upon whether the officials' statutory rights have been waived
under the collective bargaining agreement.' 66 The contractual ques-
tion must be answered before the statutory question is reached. As
with other contractual issues, an arbitrator chosen by the parties to
the dispute is better equipped to determine whether a union leader's
rights have been contractually waived, and thus, whether any unfair
labor practice has occurred. Arbitrators' sensitivity to the realities of
the workplace and the emphasis they place on ascertaining and giving
effect to the intent of the parties assures that the collective bargaining
agreement, contracted to by the parties, will serve its purpose of pro-
163. For a discussion of NLRB abdication, see Member Zimmerman's dissenting opinions
in United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984), and Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573
(1984). See also Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 355 (1985).
164. See, e.g., Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 278 N.L.R.B. 713, 716 (1986).
165. 263 N.L.R.B. 136 (1982).
166. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 707, 710 (1983).
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moting peaceful labor relations through industrial self-government.
Allotting the selective discipline issue to the arbitral forum has
entailed some reassessment by arbitrators of the values that need to be
considered in resolving the matter. Arbitrators, however, seem to be
up to the task. The imposition of external law in the form of waiver
and deferral standards has resulted in greater sensitivity on the part of
arbitrators to the statutory policies that support and underlie the col-
lective bargaining system, thereby enhancing, rather than undermin-
ing, their role in that system.
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